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Abstract
What are the primary sources of power in the evolving international order? This 
paper argues that governments of rising regional powers increasingly engage in 
informal advocacy, mediation and substitution networks to pursue their interests in 
the multipolar system. It provides empirical evidence for this claim by illustrating 
how Germany, described by many as Europe’s current hegemon, entered or estab-
lished multilateral networks to ameliorate its negotiation position. As one of the 
world’s most connected states, Germany found itself structurally bound to partici-
pating in and seeking to shape multiple informal institutions. Not only due to it’s 
lack of military power, Germany is thus likely to evolve into a state whose foreign 
policy effectiveness depends to a relatively large degree on its ‘network power’. The 
pecularities of its political system, its European socialization and increasing inter-
national demands for German diplomatic leadership present conducive conditions 
for Berlin to play a protagonist role in the networked world order.
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Introduction
Continuity has been the key feature of German foreign policy for the last 60 
years. Or as former foreign minister Klaus Kinkel put it, the most important for-
eign policy principles are “continuity, continuity, and continuity!” (Cit. in Sand-
schneider 2012, 5). This, above party line consensus, stands for the credibility, pre-
dictability and responsibility of the Federal Republic. Since then, in principle, all 
governments have referred to the continuity of the following threefold consensus 
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as the one and only alternative: (1) institutionalized multilateralism of a Europe-
anized Germany and embeddedness in the transatlantic alliance; (2) self-restraint 
in the pursuit of national interests, no unilateralism and no power projection; and 
(3) a civilian focus of foreign policy and the abandonment of military instruments 
to the greatest possible extent.
Today, the validity of many elements of this consensus is being challenged, and 
German foreign policy is adapting to the profound transformation of the global 
order. First, shifts of relative capabilities generated new power poles in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. Second, the patterns of behavior and means of foreign 
policy enactment have changed dramatically. In the past decade, change and in-
novation in the meshwork of global politics have been induced through formal 
and informal sites of negotiation and by the establishment of intergovernmental 
clubs and foreign policy networks. Therefore, third, the procedural culture of in-
ternational relations has fundamentally changed. The diplomatic culture of the 
networked world order is marked by an informal multilateralism, through which 
situational, policy-specific coalitions determine the outcomes of global bargains. 
And as a consequence of the latter, foreign policy is not exclusively made by dip-
lomats anymore. The effects of globalization assign international dimensions to 
most issue areas and government departments.
The most visible efforts in adapting German foreign policy to these challenges 
can be seen in a range of strategy papers for different world regions (Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa) and diverse internationalizing policies (culture, science, 
technology and education). These concepts have been developed over the last few 
years in collaboration among multiple ministries and external experts. In 2013, 
the then-head of the Federal Foreign Office’s policy planning staff highlighted 
the networking function of the ministry, enabling not only international linkages 
but also its role as a domestic coordination platform “providing a center in which 
various issue-specific policies would be bundled and integrated into a coherent 
foreign policy” (Bagger 2013). In 2015, then German foreign minister Steinmeier 
contended that while Germany’s foreign policy would maintain its basic tenets 
such as the strong transatlantic alliance and a close German-French partnership 
within a united Europe, continuity would not suffice to adapt to key challenges of 
“crisis management, the changing global order, and our [German] position within 
Europe” (Steinmeier 2015). At the technical level, the Foreign Office established 
a new Dialogue and Information System (DILGIS) to promote a better internal 
coordination of different issue-specific cooperation projects with rising powers. 
In addition, the Foreign Office coordinated consultations among 13 government 
departments that led to the announcement of a new approach toward the evolving 
international order in 2012. In that strategy paper entitled “Shaping Globaliza-
tion: Expanding Partnerships, Sharing Responsibility” the German government 
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reaffirms the coordinates of its foreign policy: “Freedom and human rights, de-
mocracy and the rule of law, peace and security, prosperity and sustainable devel-
opment, strong bilateral relations and effective multilateralism are the principles 
we seek to uphold when defining our goals” (Federal Foreign Office 2012, 6). In 
a nutshell, the government document heralds the continuity of these principles 
but a shift in approach. For instance, not only does it attempt to connect civilian 
identity with shifting international politics, it also responds to increasing expecta-
tions to take more global responsibility. The assumption is that, over time, more 
states and issues will become interconnected in networks of mutual dependence 
defined by accepted standards of behavior and shared expectations of peaceful 
change. Germany has initiated the founding of the Group of 20 (G20), has been 
among the largest donors to budgets of the European Union (EU), the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN), chaired 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2016, 
and became involved in institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Yet, beyond this 
engagement in International Organizations (IO) and international clubs, Berlin’s 
activities in interstate networks arguably make the key difference for its future 
ability in shaping the global order. 
How can states such as Germany which exhibit relatively limited material re-
sources impact the multipolar global order? This article approaches the question 
in two steps. Its first part develops the concept of ‘network power’ and discusses its 
relative advantage for understanding the changes in Germany’s evolving foreign 
policy approach. The second part illustrates the concept’s utility by examining the 
shape and consequences of Germany’s recent engagement in mediation, advocacy, 
and substitution networks. It concludes that the case of Germany demonstrates 
how a rising power with relatively limited material resources can exploit foreign 
policy networks to garner international legitimacy and bargaining power. Con-
secutive German governments in the 2000s have focused on interest-driven in-
tergovernmental groups to pursue international goals. Both domestic constraints 
to use other power resources as well as the increasing importance of inter-state 
networks have facilitated this strategic choice, and brought Germany overall in a 
relatively favorable position to project its power at a global scale. 
German Power in the Shifting Order: A Conceptual Framework
Thinking about reunified Germany’s role in this shifting order has to start with 
its positioning in the global hierarchy of power. A structural account assumes 
that relative power resources set limits on state action before choice is driven 
by domestic variables or the constraints imposed by international institutions 
and, consequently, that foreign policy strategies must be consistent with the op-
portunities afforded by the international system (Zakaria 1992; Sperling 2001). 
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A short glance at Berlin’s material capabilities shows relatively mediocre results. 
In terms of military resources, it operates no nuclear capabilities and has been 
reducing conventional-armament expenditure for the last twenty years, a trend 
that was only reversed in 2015 when defense minister Ursula von der Leyen an-
nounced that the Bundeswehr’s overall budget and in particular spending on 
equipment and maintenance would be increased (Braw 2016). This trend will 
continue, particularly since the Trump administration stated at the February 2017 
NATO summit that Washington’s commitments in Europe will depend on the 
increase of defense spending by European NATO allies. This message delivered 
by Defense Secretary Mattis was directed mainly to Berlin, as Europe’s biggest 
economy is still far from spending the agreed 2 percent of its GDP on defense.
Even though even though the merits of its often-praised and indeed successful 
export economy are based on a sound industrial fundament and relatively bal-
anced public finances, this economic success story might be short-lived. Because 
the prospects of Germany’s demographic shrinkage – in sharp contrast to demo-
graphic developments in India, Brazil and other rising economies – will likely 
reduce the German share of the global economy in the medium term. Therefore, 
even though its hard power deficiencies do not hinder Berlin to be one of the 
biggest contributors to the UN budget, Germany’s classification as a great power 
largely lacks material substance (Schöllgen 2000; Gujer 2007).
Despite its limited material capabilities, Germany is facing growing external ex-
pectations to play a more active and a more robust international role. European 
observers consider Germany an “indispensable power” (Ash 2011). Public opin-
ion attests to Germany’s positive image, which according to a global survey of 
16.000 people is perceived as the ‘best country’ ranked by global performance 
in areas such as entrepreneurship, cultural influence, business-friendly policies 
and economic progress (US News 2016). Its leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel, is 
perceived as the most trusted national leader on handling domestic and interna-
tional affairs according to a study by Harvard University’s Kennedy School and 
the ‘Person of the Year 2015’ according to Time Magazine (Saich 2014; Gibbs 
2015). In 2011, then Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski reminded Ber-
lin of its special responsibility in overcoming the European debt crisis, stating 
that he “fear[ed] Germany’s power less than her inactivity” (Sikorski 2011; for a 
recent summary of the discussion on Germany’s leadership in Europe, see Mat-
thijs 2016). Moreover, Israeli deputy foreign minister Daniel Ayalon emphasized 
Germany’s crucial role in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, demanding that 
Germany influences European states that import Iranian oil. None of those voices 
is suspect to argue against the background of historical amnesia. These positive 
perceptions and expectations reflect and increase the legitimacy of German for-
eign policy.
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Legitimacy and confidence of others are ideational capabilities that impact the 
global power hierarchy (Nicholson 2015). The sources of Berlin’s international 
recognition can be subsumed to the term “leading by example.” Germany’s ide-
ational resources consist of representing general and widely shared values (such 
as multilateralism, democracy, and human rights) on the one hand, and its more 
specific and partly unique merits (coming to terms with its past, social market 
economy, cutting edge in green economy, industrial innovation, responsible bud-
getary policies and smart crisis management) on the other hand. Another ex-
ample is Berlin’s nonnuclear power status, which makes it more credible in lob-
bying for nonproliferation. Moreover, Germany’s nuclear restraint legitimizes its 
claim for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 
accordance with the argument that nonnuclear actors should also be represented 
in global security policy making.
In view of the superior military capabilities of the United Kingdom and France, 
a compilation of relative material and ideational resources still reflects a multi-
polar European system.1 In fact, as Nicholson poignantly argues, while Germany 
has successfully expanded its ‘soft power’ capabilities, its government still has to 
narrow the gap between the hype about its might and actual foreign policy out-
comes (Nicholson 2015). It is therefore surprising and seemingly inappropriate 
to describe Germany as Europe’s new hegemon – even if the term “hegemon” is 
tempered with attributes like “reluctant” and “overstrained” (Paterson 2011; Kle-
ine-Brockhoff and Maull 2011). To explain this puzzling contradiction between 
ascribed roles and relative power status, an analysis of how power in general, and 
German influence in particular, is produced and projected in the multipolar order 
is needed. In this regard, we will argue in the following that the relative weight 
of different power types (e.g., material, ideational and institutional) is shifting in 
favor of those resources Berlin has at its disposal.
The increasing interdependence of states in dealing with the structural deficits 
of the global financial order and global climate issues reduces the relative signifi-
cance of military capabilities in global politics. High levels of economic interde-
pendence and, in particular, high expectations of future trade will foster peace 
(Copeland 1996). The likelihood of great-power wars in the upcoming multipolar 
order is low because the existing international order is more open, consensual, 
and rule-based than past international orders ever were. Thus, from the perspec-
tive of rising powers, it is easier to join and harder to overturn because they can 
gradually rise up through the hierarchies of international institutions – especially 
as the United States has not threatened the vital interests of rising powers (Iran 
is not considered part of this category) (Ikenberry and Wright 2008). From the 
1 This is illustrated, for example, in surveys on systemic power concentration in Europe in 1985 and 
1995 (Sperling 1999, 396–97)
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perspective of the United States, it is also advisable to try to reform and con-
solidate formal institutions, thus enabling them to persist “after hegemony,” while 
also reflecting its own interests and values (Keohane 1984). Both causalities are 
not applicable to declining powers such as the Russian Federation, which can be 
expected to produce limited conflicts attempting to maintain at least parts of its 
former sphere of influence.
From a global perspective, the case of Russia demonstrates that military capabili-
ties are still important, foremost in contributing to prevent great¬-power wars as 
vehicles of change. The distinct military supremacy of the United States would 
make it potentially very costly for any single great power or great-power alliance 
to take a stand against the dominant military power. In addition, because of the 
possession of nuclear weapons by all established (and some rising) powers, the 
violent redistribution of power might well be expected to be a zero-sum game. In 
short, change in the twenty-first century will not come about by military alliance 
building and great-power wars. Rather, it will be expressed through three parallel 
processes: (1) the gradual reform, if possible, of outdated formal institutions; (2) 
the subtle decrease of their significance if they prove to be resistant to reform; and 
(3) the emergence of network patterns resultant from the strategies and behaviors 
of state actors who have become discontent with the formalized status quo of the 
international system (Flemes 2013, 1020).
Against this global background, some attempts to conceptualize German power 
seem to be more promising than others. The central power approach stresses Ger-
many’s role as Europe’s most populated country in its geographical center, its bor-
dering of nine states and its projection of power toward Eastern Europe (Volgy 
and Schwarz 1994; Baumann 2007). Besides its regional focus, the concept over-
looks Germany’s prospective demographic development and stresses geographic 
variables that have lost ground in the course of economic, social and media glo-
balization. Most importantly, the term “central power” wrongly suggests a high 
level of power concentration – as if Europe is marked by a unipolar structure. 
The trading power concept mono-causally focuses on economic resources and 
strategies (Rosecrance 1986; Staack, n.d.). Consequently, it also fails to provide an 
appropriate framework for analysing the interdependence of diverse global issue 
areas such as transnational terrorism, climate change and global health.
Other conceptualizations of power are more in line with the peculiar composition 
of German foreign policy resources as well as with the features of the shifting 
world order. First, the soft power approach is focusing on moral and intellectual 
leadership and, in particular on co-optive power, which is the ability to shape 
what others want (Nye 1990; 2004). Co-optive power rests on the attractiveness 
of one’s culture and values. Culture and values are not only projected by the Ger-
man government, but also by nongovernmental organizations such as German 
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political foundations, the Goethe Institute, and the German Academic Exchange 
Service.
Second, the conceptual frameworks of middle and civilian powers promise a 
great deal of explanatory power for German foreign policy. The overriding goal of 
middle powers is the creation of global rules and international consensus. Accord-
ingly, middle powers’ foreign policy objectives overlap with the “civilian ends” of 
foreign policy, such as responsibility for the global environment and the diffusion 
of equality and justice (Duchêne 1973; Maull 1990). These are “milieu goals” rath-
er than “possession goals,” to use Arnold Wolfers’ distinction – the latter further 
the national interest, while the former aim to shape the environment in which 
the state operates (Wolfers 1962, 73–74). Although, milieu goals may only be a 
means of achieving possession goals, they are also goals that transcend the nation-
al interest and are shared widely. In other words, a sense of “global responsibility” 
is present in the case of a middle power (Schoeman 2003, 351; For a critical view 
on the concept’s utility to account for Germany’s future foreign policy agenda, 
see Kappel 2014, 348–49). According to the behavioral definition, middle powers 
pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, tend to seek compromise 
positions in international disputes, and embrace notions of “good international 
citizenship” to guide diplomacy (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1991, 19).
Third, network power is a subcategory of institutional power focusing on how 
states project power through interest-driven foreign policy groupings character-
ized by the cooperative, repeated and enduring interactions among its member 
states (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997). Foreign policy networks lack a legitimate 
organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve internal disputes. Network power 
increases with the location at the crossroads of various foreign policy networks, 
such as mediation, advocacy and substitution networks (Flemes 2013). In the 
current order, these comparative advantages increase not only with the number of 
network memberships, but also with the dissimilarity (clubs of established pow-
ers, emerging powers, developing countries and clubs of mixed membership) and 
the looseness of the different foreign policy networks. What ultimately governs 
international relations is not states, but the connectivity to which states are able 
to agree (Karp 2005, 71).
Foreign policy networks represent a specific mode of international interaction, 
which is grounded in three principles: (1) networks’ member states are mutu-
ally dependent; (2) the ties between member states can serve as channels for the 
transmission of both material and nonmaterial products; and (3) persistent pat-
terns of association among member states create structures that can define, enable 
or restrict their foreign policy behavior (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). 
Hence, network power that is most pronounced in advocacy networks is a product 
of the repeated experiences of cooperation and shared learning processes among 
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network partners, on the one hand, and comparatively greater reliability in the 
actions of and more familiarity with the policy-specific interests and strategies of 
their peers, on the other.
Against the conceptual background of co-optive, middle and network power, 
German foreign policy change is detected in the following by analyzing shifts and 
adaptations along one antithetic dimension that has been predominantly marked 
by continuity over the last six decades, namely the shift from a focus on insti-
tutionalized organizations toward a stronger engagement in intergovernmental 
networks. A complex interplay of external and domestic influence factors is con-
ditioning the processes of change in this field, which constitutes one element of a 
broader reorientation of Germany’s foreign policy.
New Multilateral Deal:  From Institutions to Networks
The global trend of increasing bilateralism applies to German foreign policy as 
well. And the old leitmotiv of cooperation through durable and institutionalized 
organizations is losing ground. One of the key elements of the civilian power 
concept refers to the willingness to develop supranational structures to address 
critical issues of international management (Maull 1990, 93; see also Rosecrance 
1986 on trading states). Still, it is argued that “Germany must transfer sovereignty 
to be able to exert influence”, whereas others plead for a German multilateralism 
that is more flexible (Kleine-Brockhoff and Maull 2011, 60; Sandschneider 2012, 
8). The latter view is more instrumental in face of the decreasing significance of 
reform-resistant institutions that will potentially be challenged by intergovern-
mental network patterns in the middle-term.
From a global perspective, the paradigm of supra-nationalism always has been 
highly contested and the changing features of the global order reinforce this ten-
dency. Against the background of globalization in general and the internation-
alization of formerly domestic policies in particular, the predominant majority 
of states are not only driven by their national interests, but also increasingly by 
domestic political calculation. This is not only because of the aforementioned re-
duced degree of elite autonomy in view of a more critical public, but also because 
the foreign policy elite itself is expanding with more diverse interests. Therefore, 
the challenge consists in pursuing national interests by seeking pragmatic solu-
tions for emerging problems in repeated and punctual bargains.
The global system is indicative of the way being paved back to Westphalia (that 
is if it had ever actually been abandoned). This process is being spearheaded by 
China, Russia, India and Brazil, who are staunch guardians of the principle of 
national sovereignty – not least because of their national weaknesses and territo-
rial vulnerabilities (i.e., Tibet, Chechnya, Kashmir and the Amazon). The rising 
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powers as well as the United States avoid institutionalized binding, let alone su-
pranational treaties. Just as one cannot be a federalist on one’s own, one cannot be 
a supranational institutionalist on one’s own either.
In this setting Germany seems to follow a resocialization path in power-political 
terms as it seeks more power within multilateral institutions like the UNSC, while 
becoming less willing to transfer sovereignty to them (Hellmann 2004; Kundnani 
2011, 35). The German claim to permanent representation in the UNSC gives 
direction to a new multilateral deal given that nondiscrimination and the indivis-
ibility of rights and duties lie at the heart of orthodox multilateralism (Ruggie 
1994). Undermining these principles instead of at least lobbying for a European 
seat reflects the modus operandi of realpolitik as alien to civilian power. 
Instead of a European initiative, Germany preferred to channel its candidacy 
through an intergovernmental network based on common interests. The G4 lobby 
with Brazil, India and Japan mainly aims to improve its members’ positions in the 
international power hierarchy, but bases its claim on a civilian power discourse 
that advocates good global citizenship, solidarity and the diffusion of equality 
and justice. 
The blueprint of network strategies has been delivered by Brazil, China, India, 
and South Africa. Their approach is reflected in their omnipresence on the global 
stage in flexible coalitions (e.g., BRICS, IBSA and BASIC), all of which are char-
acterized by a low degree of institutionalization (G3, G5 and O5 of the Heili-
gendamm process). This network strategy guarantees a maximum of national sov-
ereignty, flexibility and independence to the rising powers’ foreign-policy makers. 
The soft balancing behavior of those state actors discontented with the status 
quo institutions has brought forth an incremental reform of the international 
order. One of the most fundamental changes induced by these innovators has 
been a change in the procedural culture of international relations. What has con-
sequently emerged is a zeitgeist of multilateral informality (Flemes 2013, 1022).
The BRICS format demonstrated how establishing alternative platforms impacts 
global institutions pushing for the reform of global financial institutions. At the 
first summit in Russia in 2009, the then BRIC countries advocated for a reform 
of the IMF voting quota system. In 2010 at the G20 meeting in South Korea 
the finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 agreed on a shift in 
country representation at the IMF of six percent in favor of dynamic emerging 
markets, which moved the BRIC countries up to be among the top ten share-
holders of the IMF.
In comparison with the BRICS states, Berlin’s network diplomacy in both num-
ber and protagonism of promoted global foreign policy networks is still under-
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developed, though evolving. The new playing fields of German foreign policy can 
be distinguished in mediation, advocacy and substitution networks (Flemes 2013, 
1023–27).
First, mediation networks such as the Middle East Quartet and the Six-Party 
Talks on North Korea tackle global security issues. The established great powers 
have so far successfully defended these last exclusive domains of high politics. 
However, the inclusion of Germany in the P5-plus-1 group on the Iranian nucle-
ar issue portends the demise of these prerogatives. The P5-plus-1 exemplifies how 
mediation networks can successfully downgrade global security threats. Most im-
portantly, Germany played a key role in promoting mediation networks in order 
to resolve the Ukraine crisis, respectively the conflict between Kiev and Moscow. 
Foreign minister Steinmeier started a trilateral initiative with his French and Pol-
ish colleagues to stop violence at the Maidan in February 2014. Another example 
is the OSCE roundtable format chaired by German Ambassador Wolfgang Isch-
inger to incent the dialogue between the parties of the Eastern Ukrainian conflict 
(Nüstling 2014). In general, the government of Chancellor Merkel conducted 
the European reactions to President Putin’s Ukraine policies and determined the 
rhythm of international sanctions against Russia. Starting by moderating the 
EU’s position after the shooting of flight MH17 in July 2014, Angela Merkel 
changed her tone in a speech after a confidential bilateral talk with Vladimir Pu-
tin at the G20 summit in Brisbane. She accused the Russian President of break-
ing international law and endangering peace in Europe by destabilizing not only 
Ukraine, but also Georgia, Moldavia and potentially Serbia (FAZ 2014).
Second, advocacy networks such as the G4 are foreign policy networks among 
peers linked by common interests in global politics. The origins of such networks 
primarily stem from soft balancing coalitions; their membership consists mainly 
of non-status-quo powers. And third, substitution networks as the G20 are the 
product of the systematic pressures generated by rising powers. They have a mixed 
membership of established and rising powers and claim to be universally rep-
resentative. Substitution networks have as their aim the replacement of formal 
institutions. 
The competitive advantages of network powers arise, at least in part, from their 
privileged access to information. The more network links state actors build, the 
more powerful and autonomous they will potentially be (Slaughter 2009, 112). 
In addition, the experiences of cooperation and shared learning processes among 
network powers allow them to relate to each other on the basis of greater credibil-
ity and predictability in their reciprocal behavior. These comparative advantages 
are most pronounced – and the position of the broker state is most beneficial and 
influential – when only the actor can connect several clusters of states and resolve 
interconnected problems of multilateral coordination.
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Germany has joined the foreign policy networks of both established and rising 
powers. Through the G4 it maintains “special relationships” with Brazil and In-
dia, and through the G8 Berlin regularly coordinates its global policies with the 
established great powers. The network analysis perspective suggests that midlevel, 
open and connected powers like Germany and the IBSA states in particular – 
skilled at building and exploiting their position in multiple networks – may gain 
global influence (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009, 572). There-
fore, the asymmetry in influence (decision makers versus decision takers) vis-à-vis 
their regional neighbors, who are mostly excluded from global advocacy networks, 
will increase further.
Connectedness in international relations results from establishing multiple net-
work links and leads to the the ability to hold privileged roles as bridge-builders 
and agenda-setters, which can be decisive power resources in the changing global 
order. Powerful states in prestigious network positions incrementally become the 
destination of cooperation proposals and, consequently, have to bear lower search 
costs than others (Flemes 2013, 1030). Conversely, network opportunities de-
crease with an increase in the number of hostile relations that exist with single 
major powers. In this regard, Germany, Brazil and South Africa are all on good 
terms with the established great powers. This may partially compensate for their 
hard power deficiencies compared to China and India – both of which maintain 
a competitive relationship with each other (besides the several further constraints 
existing in the Asian securit y cluster). However, because of their multiple in-
stances of friendly relations with their peers, network powers are actually rela-
tively independent from single great powers—even though these great powers 
might command superior material resources (ibid.: 1027).
German foreign-policy makers are challenged by the complex interlinkages and 
interdependencies of the new world order just as decision makers in any other 
state. But three clusters of peculiarities of German foreign policy prepare Berlin 
to better utilize those interlinkages to actively shape the new global order.
First, a comparative advantage for Berlin in the course of the global transfor-
mation process outlined above might be that the new multipolarity and the re-
sulting patterns of interaction (such as the increasing need to build multilateral 
compromise) are deeply rooted in Germany’s political system and its vision of 
international politics. International consensus power – understood as controlling 
and timing the agenda to permanently compromise on the resulting consensus 
– finds a domestic equivalent in the German political system: the politics of the 
third way (Czempiel 1999). The domestic culture of power sharing is the result of 
processes of permanent bargaining and consensus seeking, which are the result of 
a political system based on federalism, coalition governments and social partner-
ship between labor unions and business associations known as communitarian 
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corporatism (Katzenstein 1997). This domestic experience influences the struc-
tural disposition for similar approaches to solving international problems (Staack 
2007, 92). The decentralization of German political power after World War II 
was a key concern of the Anglo-American occupying authorities, who believed 
that a centralized German state could lead to the resurrection of military power.
Second, European multipolarity in general, and the EU institutions in particular, 
have socialized Germany’s foreign policy elites. The intergovernmental pillars of 
the EU can be seen as a laboratory of the networked world order, while the widely 
accepted EU 3 network (i.e., Germany, France and the United Kingdom) has 
long been playing a decisive part in European security affairs.
Third, the specific composition of German foreign policy resources with its dis-
tinguished weight of ideational capabilities (e.g., international recognition, legiti-
macy and moral authority) enables Berlin to build consensus in the context of 
intergovernmental networks. 
In the networked world order, consensual and co-optive strategies are and in-
creasingly will be pivotal for conducting diplomacy effectively. In this regard, the 
German foreign policy approach toward states that are driven by divergent norms 
and values (e.g., Iran, Russia, and China) is largely based on operationalizing ide-
ational resources, trying to convince, persuade or co-opt them, including them in 
multilateral contexts, relying on the socializing effects of value-driven reciprocity.
Moreover, Berlin is increasingly looking to project strategic assets such as the 
country’s cutting edge in green economy as well as its excellence in industries, 
science and innovation through advocacy networks. As Germany forms security 
alliances with some states and trades with others, it will have to form distinct net-
works to pursue its climate- and currency-related interests. In the context of the 
middle power concept, similar foreign policy behavior has been framed as “niche 
diplomacy” (Cooper 1997) or “functional leadership” (Wood 1988, 3). These at-
tributes are ascribed to states that cannot act effectively alone, but may have a 
systemic impact in a small group of states and through the employment of their 
specific capabilities (e.g., peacekeeping) or expertise in specific issue areas (e.g., 
nuclear nonproliferation). In this regard, it might even be possible to conceive of 
different major power hierarchies across various issues areas. For instance, both 
Brazilian and Japanese foreign policies have sought to achieve major power status 
in climate change politics (Barros-Platiau 2010; Kanie 2011).
The situation will become more complicated following the extension of the G20 
agenda beyond purely economic and financial issues. At the G20 summit, held in 
Seoul in 2010, global problems such as corruption, energy and food security were 
also discussed. In the post-Copenhagen context, analysts and diplomats have 
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looked to the G20 as an alternative forum in which to break the current deadlock 
between the United States, the EU, and the BASIC network. At the 2012 sum-
mit in Los Cabos, the Mexican presidency highlighted developmental policies, 
whereas Russia’s G20 presidency in 2013 focused on energy sustainability, but 
ended up debating a global security issue (Syria conflict). The G20 summit in 
Brisbane in 2014 was marked by the Ukraine crisis and public considerations 
by the Australian government to exclude the Russian President Putin from the 
summit, while the 2015 summit in Antalya focused on terrorism, migration, and 
climate change. Global health and trade are other potential issue areas that might 
be negotiated through the G20. An extended G20 agenda can turn the summits 
into locations of highly complex cross-issue bargaining – for instance, cutbacks in 
agricultural subsidies in return for the reduction of CO2 emissions.
At the individual analysis level, the informal and situational character of network 
bargains strengthens the role of political leaders and the impact of their person-
alities with the respective abilities to negotiate, identify windows of opportunity 
and manage different communication ties at the same time. At the (inter)state 
level, governments have to meet two preconditions to not be taken advantage of 
by their counterparts in the course of cross-policy negotiations. First, there is an 
increasing need for the coordination and formulation of competence guidelines 
for foreign policy at the state level, because ministries of environment, health, 
foreign affairs and trade have to coordinate their specific interests so as to not be 
played off against each other in the course of multilateral cross-policy bargaining. 
Second, before being able to build cross-issue coalitions, a state has to find those 
players that share issue-specific interests and form alliances with them (Flemes 
2013, 1030–31).
As mentioned above, the German government has formulated strategy papers for 
different internationalizing policies. One key example of a policy-specific net-
work seeking to put these policy guidelines into operation is the Renewables 
Club. On the invitation of Germany’s then environment minister, Peter Altmaier, 
representatives from 10 countries gathered in Berlin in June 2013 to establish 
the foreign policy network. In addition to Germany, the club’s heavyweights are 
China, France, India, South Africa and the United Kingdom. Believing them-
selves to be policy pioneers, the common goal of these governments is to scale up 
the deployment of renewable energy worldwide.
In March 2013, the fourth Petersberg Climate Dialogue took place in Berlin. Un-
der the heading “Shaping the future”, Germany and Poland invited 35 ministers 
from around the world to build consensus on the long-term climate goals to be 
discussed at the 2013 UN climate summit in Warsaw. The Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research promotes multilateral cooperation in science, innovation and 
technology as part of its efforts to build networks and strategic partnerships that 
264
Daniel Flemes, Hannes Ebert
“strengthen Germany’s role in the global knowledge society” (Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research 2008). Another potential area for network building is 
the fight against transnational organized crime, where Germany could work with 
the key production, transit and consumer countries of cocaine – Colombia, Bra-
zil and Spain – for more effective measures against drug trafficking and money 
laundering by connecting European and South American security governance 
schemes (Flemes and Radseck 2013).
Conclusion
This article contributed to understanding Germany’s recent foreign policy reori-
entation in the context of major domestic and international political changes by 
developing the concept of ‘network power’. According to a 2016 study by McK-
insey, a consultancy firm, amidst an unprecedented expansion of the global net-
work of goods, services, finance, people, and data and community, Germany is the 
world’s fourth most connected state (adjusted for country size) (McKinsey Global 
Institute 2016, 12). Given its relatively great stakes in the stability of its networks, 
Germany’s foreign policy is thus bound to change. Based on a distinction between 
mediation, advocacy, and substitution networks, an analysis of German foreign 
policy activities within these networks illustrated the increasing relative weight of 
network connectivity as compared to alternative power resources. In addition, the 
paper highlighted that Germany is set to benefit from the growing importance of 
network connectivity.
How Berlin utilizes this comparative advantage in the future depends on its abil-
ity to balance its traditional foreign policy pillars, e.g. strong German-French 
and transatlantic partnerships and Europeanized interests, with evolving priori-
ties regarding maintaining influence in new formal and informal institutions. If 
the German government manages to reconcile both prerogatives, it has an op-
portunity to turn Germany’s ‘unipolar moment’ in Europe into value-oriented 
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